CVE-2022-29464 _ detailed analysis of a ShadowPad intrusion
🕳️

CVE-2022-29464 _ detailed analysis of a ShadowPad intrusion

📅 [ Archival Date ]
Oct 3, 2022 6:51 PM
🏷️ [ Tags ]
ShadowPadCVE-2022-29464
✍️ [ Author ]

William Backhouse (@Will0x04), Michael Mullen (@DropTheBase64) and Nikolaos Pantazopoulos

💣 [ PoC / Exploit ]

Summary

tl;dr

This post explores some of the TTPs employed by a threat actor who was observed deploying ShadowPad during an incident response engagement.

Below provides a summary of findings which are presented in this blog post:

  • Initial access via CVE-2022-29464.
  • Successive backdoors installed – PoisonIvy, a previously undocumented backdoor and finally ShadowPad.
  • Establishing persistence via Windows Services to execute legitimate binaries which sideloads backdoors, including ShadowPad.
  • Use of information gathering tools such as ADFind and PowerView.
  • Lateral movement leveraging RDP and ShadowPad.
  • Use of 7zip for data collection.
  • ShadowPad used for Command and Control.
  • Exfiltration of data.

ShadowPad

This blog looks to build on the work of other security research done by SecureWorks and PwC with firsthand experience of TTPs used in a recent incident where ShadowPad was deployed. ShadowPad is a modular remote access trojan (RAT) which is thought to be used almost exclusively by China-Based threat actors.

Attribution

Based on the findings of our Incident Response investigation, NCC Group assesses with high confidence that the threat actor detailed in this article was a China-based Advanced Persistent Threat (APT).

This is based on the following factors

  • ShadowPad – Public reporting has previously indicated the distribution of ShadowPad is tightly controlled and is typically exclusive to China-based threat actors for use during espionage campaigns.
  • TTPs – Specific TTPs observed during the attack were found to match those previously observed by China-based threat actors, both within NCC Group incident response engagements and the wider security community.
  • Activity pattern analysis – The threat actor was typically active during the hours of 01:00 – 09:00 (UTC) which matches the working hours of China

TTPs

Initial Access

A recent vulnerability in WSO2, CVE-2022-29464 [3], was the root cause of the incident. The actor, amongst other attackers, was able to exploit the vulnerability soon after it was published to create web shells on a server.

The actor leveraged a web shell to load a backdoor, in this case PoisonIvy. This was deployed via a malicious DLL and leveraged DLL Search Order Hijacking, a tactic which was continuously leveraged throughout the attack.

Execution

Certutil.exe was used via commands issued on web shells to install the PoisonIvy backdoor on patient zero.

The threat actor leveraged command prompt and PowerShell throughout the incident.

Additionally, several folders named _MEI<random digits> were observed within the Windows\Temp folder. The digits in the folder name change each time a binary is compiled. These folders are created on a host when a python executable is compiled. Within these folders were the .pyd library files and DLL files. The created time for these folders matched the last modified time stamp of the complied binary within the shimcache.

Persistence

Run Keys and Windows services were used throughout in order to ensure the backdoors deployed obtained persistence.

Defense Evasion

The threat actor undertook significant anti-forensic actions on ShadowPad related files to evade detection. This included timestomping the malicious DLL and applying the NTFS attributes of hidden and system to the files. Legitimate but renamed Windows binaries were used to load the configuration file. The threat actor also leveraged a legitimate Windows DLL, secur32.dll, as the name of the configuration file for the ShadowPad backdoor.

All indicators of compromise, aside from backdoor modules and loaders, were removed from the hosts by the threat actor.

Credential Access

The threat actor was observed collecting all web browser credentials from all hosts across the environment. It is unclear at this stage how this was achieved with the evidence available.

Discovery

A vast array of tooling was used to scan and enumerate the network as the actor negotiated their way through it, these included but were not limited to the following:

  • AdFind
  • NbtScan
  • PowerView
  • PowerShell scripts to enumerate hosts on port 445
  • Tree.exe

Lateral Movement

Lateral movement was largely carried out using Windows services, particularly leveraging SMB pipes. The only interactive sessions observed were onward RDP sessions to customer connected sites.

Collection

In addition to the automated collection of harvested credentials, the ShadowPad keylogger module was used in the attack, storing the keystrokes in encrypted database files for exfiltration. The output of which was likely included in archive files created by the attacker, along with the output of network scanning and reconnaissance.

Command and Control

In total, three separate command and control infrastructures were identified, all of which utilised DLL search order hijacking / DLL side loading. The initial payload was PoisonIvy, this was only observed on patient zero. The threat actor went on to deploy a previously undocumented backdoor once they gained an initial foothold in the network, this framework established persistence via a service called K7AVWScn, masquerading as an older anti-virus product. Finally, once a firm foothold was established within the network the threat actor deployed ShadowPad. Notably, the ShadowPad module for the proxy feature was also observed during the attack to proxy C2 communications via a less conspicuous server.

Exfiltration

Due to the exfiltration capabilities of ShadowPad, it is highly likely to have been the method of exfiltration to steal data from the customer network. This is further cemented by a small, yet noticeable spike in network traffic to threat actor controlled infrastructure.

Recommendations

  • Searches for the documented IOCs should be conducted
  • If IOCs are identified a full incident response investigation should be conducted

ShadowPad Technical Analysis

Initialisation phase

Upon execution, the ShadowPad core module enters an initialisation phase at which it decrypts its configuration and determines which mode it runs. In summary, we identified the following modes:

Mode ID
Description
3
Injects itself to a specified process (specified in the ShadowPad configuration) and adds persistence to the compromised host. In addition, if the compromised user belongs to a group with a SID starting with S-1-5-80- then the specified target process uses the token of ‘lsass’.
4
Injects itself to a specified process (specified in the ShadowPad configuration) and executes the core code in a new thread. In addition, if the compromised user belongs to a group with a SID starting with S-1-5-80 then the specified target process uses the token of ‘lsass’.
5
Injects itself to a specified process (specified in the ShadowPad configuration). In addition, if the compromised user belongs to a group with a SID starting with S-1-5-80 then the specified target process uses the token of ‘lsass’.
16
Injects itself to a specified process (specified in the ShadowPad configuration) and creates/starts a new service (details are specified in the ShadowPad configuration), which executes the core code. In addition, if the compromised user belongs to a group with a SID starting with S-1-5-80 then the specified target process uses the token of ‘lsass’.

Table 1 – ShadowPad Modes

ANALYST NOTE: The shellcode is decrypted using a combination of bitwise XOR operations.

Configuration storage and structure

ShadowPad comes with an embedded encrypted configuration, which it locates by scanning its own shellcode (core module) with the following method (Python representation):

for dword in range( len(data) ):
  first_value = data[dword :dword+4]
  second_value = data[dword+4:dword+8]
  third_value = data[dword+8:dword+12]
  fourth_value = data[dword+12:dword+16]
  fifth_value = data[dword+16:dword+20]
  sixth_value = data[dword+20:dword+24]

  xor1 = int.from_bytes(second_value,'little') ^ 0x8C4832F1
  xor2 = int.from_bytes(fourth_value,'little') ^ 0xC3BF9669
  xor3 = int.from_bytes(sixth_value,'little') ^  0x9C2891BA

  if xor1 == int.from_bytes(first_value,'little') and xor2 ==    int.from_bytes(third_value,'little') and xor3 == int.from_bytes(fifth_value,'little'):
     print(f"found: {dword:02x}")
     encrypted = data[dword:]
     break

After locating it successfully, it starts searching in it for a specified byte that represents the type of data (e.g., 0x02 represents an embedded module). In total, we have identified the following types:

ID
Description
0x02
Embedded ShadowPad module.
0x80
ShadowPad configuration. It should start with the DWORD value 0x9C9D22EC.
0x90
XOR key used during the generation of unique names (e.g., registry key name)
0x91
DLL loader file data.
0x92
DLL loader file to load. File might have random appended data (Depends on the config’s flag at offset 0x326).
0xA0
Loader’s filepath

Table 2 – Shadowpad Data Types

Once one of the above bytes are located, ShadowPad reads the data (size is defined before the byte identifier) and appends the last DWORD value to the hardcoded byte array ‘1A9115B2D21384C6DA3C21FCCA5201A4’. Then it hashes (MD5) the constructed byte array and derives an AES-CBC 128bits key and decrypts the data.

In addition, ShadowPad stores, in an encrypted format, the following data in the registry with the registry key name being unique (based on volume serial number of C:\) for each compromised host:

  1. ShadowPad configuration (0x80) data.
  2. Proxy configuration. Includes proxy information that ShadowPad requires. These are the network communication protocol, domain/IP proxy and the proxy port.
  3. Downloaded modules.

ShadowPad Network Servers

ShadowPad starts two TCP/UDP servers at 0.0.0.0. The port(s) is/are specified in the ShadowPad configuration. These servers work as a proxy between other compromised hosts in the network.

In addition, ShadowPads starts a raw socket server, which receives data and does one of the following tasks (depending on the received data):

  1. Updates and sets proxy configuration to SOCKS4 mode.
  2. Updates and sets proxy configuration to SOCKS5 mode.
  3. Updates and sets proxy configuration to HTTP mode.

Network Communication

ShadowPad supports a variety of network protocols (supported by dedicated modules). For all of them, ShadowPad uses the same procedure to store and encrypt network data. The procedure’s steps are:

  1. Compress the network data using the QuickLZ library module.
  2. Generates a random DWORD value, which is appended to the byte array ‘1A9115B2D21384C6DA3C21FCCA5201A4’. Then, the constructed byte array is hashed (MD5) and an AES-CBC 128bits key is derived (CryptDeriveKey).
  3. The data is then encrypted using the generated AES key. In addition, Shadowpad encrypts the following data fields using bitwise XOR operations:
  4. Command/Module ID: Command/Module ID ^ ( 0x1FFFFF * Hashing_Key – 0x2C7BEECE )
  5. Data_Size: Data_Size ^ ( 0x1FFFFFF * 0x7FFFFF * ( 0x1FFFFF * Hashing_Key – 0x2C7BEECE ) – 0x536C9757 – 0x7C06303F )
  6. Command_Execution_State: Command_Execution_State ^ 0x7FFFFF * (0x1FFFFF * Hashing_Key – 0x2C7BEECE) – 0x536C9757

As a last step, ShadowPad encapsulates the above generated data into the following structure:

struct Network_Packet
{
 DWORD Hashing_Key;
 DWORD Command_ID_Module_ID;
 DWORD Command_Execution_State; //Usually contains any error codes.
 DWORD Data_Size;
 byte data[Data_Size];
};

If any server responds, it should have the same format as above.

Network Commands and Modules

During our analysis, we managed to extract a variety of ShadowPad modules with most of them having their own set of network commands. The table below summarises the identified commands of the modules, which we managed to recover.

Module
Command ID
Description
Main module
0xC49D0031
First command sent to the C2 if the commands fetcher function does not run in a dedicated thread.
Main module
0xC49D0032
First command sent to the C2 if the commands fetcher function does run in a dedicated thread.
Main module
0xC49D0033
Fingerprints the compromised host and sends the information to the C2.
Main module
0xC49D0032
(Received) Executes the network command fetcher function in a thread.
Main module
0xC49D0034
Sents an empty reply to the C2.
Main module
0xC49D0037
Echoes the server’s reply.
Main module
0xC49D0039
Sends number of times the Shadowpad files were detected to be deleted.
Main module
0xC49D0016
Deletes Shadowpad registry keys.
Main module
0xC49D0035
Enters sleep mode for 3 seconds in total.
Main module
0xC49D0036
Enters sleep mode for 5 seconds in total.
Main module
0xC49D0010
Retrieves Shadowpad execution information.
Main module
0xC49D0012
Updates Shadowpad configuration (in registry).
Main module
0xC49D0014
Deletes Shadowpad module from registry.
Main module
0xC49D0015
Unloads a Shadowpad module.
Main module
0xC49D0020
Retrieves Shadowpad current configuration (from registry).
Main module
0xC49D0021
Updates the Shadowpad configuration in registry and (re)starts the TCP/UDP servers.
Main module
0xC49D0022
Deletes Shadowpad registry entries and starts the TCP/UDP servers.
Main module
0xC49D0050
Retrieves Shadowpad proxy configuration from registry.
Main module
0xC49D0051
Updates Shadowpad proxy configuration.
Main module
0xC49D0052
Updates Shadowpad proxy configuration by index.
Main module
0xC49D0053
Sets Shadowpad proxy configuration bytes to 0
Main module
Any Module ID
Loads and initialises the specified module ID.
Files manager module
0x67520006
File operations (copy,delete,move,rename).
Files manager module
0x67520007
Executes a file.
Files manager module
0x67520008
Uploads/Downloads file to/from C2.
Files manager module
0x6752000A
Searches for a specified file.
Files manager module
0x6752000C
Downloads a file from a specified URL.
Files manager module
0x67520005
Timestomp a file.
Files manager module
0x67520000
Get logical drives information.
Files manager module
0x67520001
Searches recursively for a file.
Files manager module
0x67520002
Checks if file/directory is writable.
Files manager module
0x67520003
Creates a directory.
Files manager module
0x67520004
Gets files list in a given directory
TCP/UDP module
0x54BD0000
Loads TCP module and proxy data via it.
TCP/UDP module
0x54BD0001
Proxies UDP network data.
Desktop module
0x62D50000
Enumerates monitors.
Desktop module
0x62D50001
Takes desktop screenshot.
Desktop module
0x62D50002
Captures monitor screen.
Desktop module
0x62D50010
Gets desktop module local database file path.
Desktop module
0x62D50011
Reads and sends the contents of local database file to the C2.
Desktop module
0x62D50012
Writes to local database file and starts a thread that constantly takes desktop screenshots.
Processes manager module
0x70D0000
Gets processes list along with their information
Processes manager module
0x70D0001
Terminates a specified process
Network Connections module
0x6D0000
Gets TCP network table.
Network Connections module
0x6D0001
Gets UDP network table.
PIPEs module
0x23220000
Reads/Writes data to PIPEs.
Propagation module
0x2C120010
Get module’s configuration.
Propagation module
0x2C120011
Transfer network data between C2 and PIPEs.
Propagation module
0x2C120012
Constant transfer of network data between C2 and PIPEs.
Propagation module
0x2C120013
Transfer network data between C2 and PIPEs.
Propagation module
0x2C120014
Constant transfer of network data between C2 and PIPEs.
Propagation module
0x2C120015
Transfer network data between C2 and PIPEs.
Propagation module
0x2C120016
Constant transfer of network data between C2 and PIPEs.
Propagation module
0x2C120017
Transfer network data between C2 and PIPEs.
Propagation module
0x2C120018
Transfer network data between C2 and PIPEs.
Scheduled tasks module
0x71CD0000
Gets a list of the scheduled tasks.
Scheduled tasks module
0x71CD0001
Gets information of a specified scheduled task.
Wi-Fi stealer module
0xDC320000
Collects credentials/information of available Wi-Fi devices.
Network discovery module
0xF36A0000
Collects MAC addresses.
Network discovery module
0xF36A0001
Collects IP addresses information.
Network discovery module
0xF36A0003
Port scanning.
Console module
0x329A0000
Starts a console mode in the compromised host.
Keylogger module
0x63CA0000
Reads the keylogger file and sends its content to the C2.
Keylogger module
0x63CA0001
Deletes keylogger file.

Table 3 – Modules Network Commands

Below are listed the available modules, which do not have network commands (Table 3).

Module ID
Description
E8B5
QUICKLZ library module.
7D82
Sockets connection module (supports SOCKS4, SOCKS5 and HTTP).
C7BA
TCP module.

Table 4 – Available modules without network commands

Below are listed the modules that we identified after analysing the main module of ShadowPad but were not recovered.

Module ID
Description
0x25B2
UDP network module.
0x1FE2
HTTP network module.
0x9C8A
HTTPS network module.
0x92CA
ICMP network module
0x64EA
Unknown

Table 5 – Non-Recovered ShadowPad Modules

Misc

  1. ShadowPad uses a checksum method to compare certain values (e.g., if it runs under certain access rights). This method has been implemented below in Python:
ror = lambda val, r_bits, max_bits: \
((val & (2**max_bits-1)) >> r_bits%max_bits) | \
(val << (max_bits-(r_bits%max_bits)) & (2**max_bits-1))
rounds = 0x80

data = b""
output = 0xB69F4F21
max_bits = 32
counter = 0

for i in range( len(data) ):
 data_character = data[counter]
 if (data_character - 97)&0xff <= 0x19:
  data_character &= ~0x20&0xfffffff
  counter +=1
  output = (data_character + ror(output, 8,32)) ^ 0xF90393D1
  print ( hex( output ))
  • Under certain modes, ShadowPad chooses to download and inject a payload from its command-and-control server. ShadowPad parses its command-and-control server domain/IP address and sends a HTTP request. The reply is expected to be a payload, which ShadowPad injects into another process.

ANALYST NOTE: In case the IP address/Domain includes the character ‘@’, ShadowPad decrypts it with a custom algorithm.

IOC
Type
Description
C:\wso2is-4.6.0\BVRPDiag.exe
File Path
Legitimate executable to sideload PoisonIvy
C:\wso2is-4.6.0\BVRPDiag.tsi
File Path
C:\wso2is-4.6.0\BVRPDiag.dll
File Path
PoisonIvy
C:\wso2is-4.6.0\ModemMOH.dll
File Path
C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\K7AVWScn.dll
File Path
Previously undocumented C2 framework
C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\K7AVWScn.doc
File Path
Unknown file in the same location as PosionIvy
C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\K7AVWScn.exe
File Path
Legitimate executable to sideload PoisonIvy
C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\secur32.dll
File Path
ShadowPad DLL
C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\secur32.dll.dat
File Path
ShadowPad Encrypted Configuration
C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\WindowsUpdate.exe
File Path
Legitimate executable to sideload ShadowPad
C:\Windows\Temp\WinLog\secur32.dll
File Path
ShadowPad DLL
C:\Windows\Temp\WinLog\secur32.dll.dat
File Path
ShadowPad Encrypted Configuration
C:\Windows\Temp\WinLog\WindowsEvents.exe
File Path
Legitimate executable to sideload ShadowPad
C:\ProgramData\7z.dll
File Path
Archiving tool
C:\ProgramData\7z.exe
File Path
Archiving tool
C:\Users\Public\AdFind.exe
File Path
Reconnaissance tooling
C:\Users\Public\nbtscan.exe
File Path
Reconnaissance tooling
C:\Users\Public\start.bat
File Path
Unknown batch script, suspected to start execution of mimikatz
C:\Users\Public\t\64.exe
File Path
Unknown executable, suspected mimikatz
C:\Users\Public\t\7z.exe
File Path
Archiving tool
C:\Users\public\t\browser.exe
File Path
Unknown attacker executable
C:\Users\Public\t\nircmd.exe
File Path
NirCmd is a small command-line utility that allows you to do some useful tasks without displaying any user interface.
C:\users\public\t\test.bat
File Path
Unknown attacker batch script
C:\Users\Public\test.bat
File Path
Unknown attacker batch script
C:\Users\Public\test.exe
File Path
Unknown attacker executable
C:\Users\Public\test\Active Directory\ntds.dit
File Path
Staging location for NTDS dump
C:\Users\Public\test\registry\SECURITY
File Path
Staging location for registry dump
C:\Users\Public\test\registry\SYSTEM
File Path
Staging location for registry dump
C:\Users\Public\WebBrowserPassView.exe
File Path
NirSoft tool for recovering credentials from web browsers.
C:\Windows\debug\adprep\P.bat
File Path
Unknown attacker batch script
C:\Windows\system32\spool\drivers\affair.exe
File Path
Unknown attacker executable
C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\SessionGopher.ps1
File Path
Decrypts saved session information for remote access tools.
C:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\tt.bat
File Path
Unknown attacker batch script
C:\Windows\Temp\best.exe
File Path
Tree.exe
ip445.ps1
File Name
Unknown PowerShell script suspected to be related to network reconnaissance
ip445.txt
File Name
Suspected output file for ip445.ps1
nbtscan.exe
File Name
Attacker tooling
SOFTWARE: Classes\CLSID\*\42BF3891
Registry Key
Encrypted ShadowPad configuration
SOFTWARE: Classes\CLSID\*\45E6A5BE
Registry Key
Encrypted ShadowPad configuration
SOFTWARE: Classes\CLSID\*\840EE6F6
Registry Key
Encrypted ShadowPad configuration
SOFTWARE: Classes\CLSID\*\9003BDD0
Registry Key
Encrypted ShadowPad configuration
Software:Classes\CLSID\*\51E27247
Registry Key
Encrypted ShadowPad configuration
Software\Microsoft\*\*\009F24BCCEA54128C2344E03CEE577E12504DD569C8B48AB8B7EAD5249778643
Registry Key
Encrypted ShadowPad module
Software\Microsoft\*\*\5F336A90564002BE360DF63106AA7A7568829C6C084E793D6DC93A896C476204
Registry Key
Encrypted ShadowPad module
Software\Microsoft\*\*\FF98EFB4C7680726BF336CEC477777BB3BEB73C7BAA1A5A574C39E7F4E804585
Registry Key
Encrypted ShadowPad module
D1D0E39004FA8138E2F2C4157FA3B44B
MD5 Hash
PoisenIvy DLL
54B419C2CAC1A08605936E016D460697
MD5 Hash
Undocumented backdoor DLL
B426C17B99F282C13593954568D86863
MD5 Hash
Undocumented backdoor related file
7504DEA93DB3B8417F16145E8272BA08
MD5 Hash
ShadowPad DLL
D99B22020490ECC6F0237EFB2C3DEF27
MD5 Hash
ShadowPad DLL
1E6E936A0A862F18895BC7DD6F607EB4
MD5 Hash
ShadowPad DLL
A6A19804248E9CC5D7DE5AEA86590C63
MD5 Hash
ShadowPad DLL
4BFE4975CEAA15ED0031941A390FAB55
MD5 Hash
ShadowPad DLL
87F9D1DE3E549469F918778BD637666D
MD5 Hash
ShadowPad DLL
8E9F8E8AB0BEF7838F2A5164CF7737E4
MD5 Hash
ShadowPad DLL
Tactic
Tecnicque
ID
Description
Initial Access
Exploit Public-Facing Applications
T1190
Initial access was gained via the threat actor exploiting CVE-2022-29464 to create a web shell
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1059:001
PowerShell based tools PowerView and SessionGopher were executed across the estate for reconnaissance and credential harvesting. Additionally, hands on keyboard commands were identified as being executed to confirm which version of the malware was present.
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
T1059:003
A scheduled task used by the threat actor was used to launch a Windows Command Shell. The purpose is not known.
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
T1059:006
Several compiled python binaries were identified. It is likely the binaries related to the creation of an FTP server.
Execution
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
T1053
A scheduled task named “update” was observed and configured to execute a command prompt on multiple hosts throughout the environment. Upon successful execution of the task the threat actor then deleted the task from the host
Execution
Exploitation for Client Execution
T1203
The threat actor leveraged CVE-2022-29464 to deploy web shells and allow remote command execution on patient zero.
Execution
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
T1047
WMI was used by the threat actor to carry out reconnaissance activity.
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.001
A run key for the local administrator was created to execute the malicious backdoor.
Persistence
Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
T1543.003
Two malicious services were deployed widely across the estate for persistence of the backdoors. Both services execute a legitimate binary which is stored in the same location as a malicious DLL, when executed the legitimate binary would side load the malicious DLL containing the backdoor.
Privilege Escalation
Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
T1078.002
The threat actor was primarily using domain administrator credentials to move laterally throughout the attack, allowing them to blend in with legitimate administrator activity.
Defence Evasion
Impair Defenses: Downgrade Attack
T1562.010
The threat actor was observed utilising PowerShell downgrades, this is typically used by threat actors to avoid the script logging capabilities of PowerShell version 5+
Defence Evasion
Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion
T1070.004
The threat actor routinely removed the majority of tooling deployed throughout the attack from hosts upon completion of their objectives.
Defence Evasion
Indicator Removal on Host: Timestomp
T1070.006
The threat actor timestomped all files relating to the backdoors including the legitimate binary and the malicious DLL.
Defence Evasion
Modify Registry
T1112
The modules for ShadowPad were stored within the registry in an encrypted format. The keys for the stored data are generated depending on the volume serial number of the host.
Defence Evasion
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027
The ShadowPad configuration was stored within an encrypted registry hive. The keylogger module of ShadowPad created an encrypted output file on the host.
Defence Evasion
Masquerading: Rename System Utilities
T1036.003
The threat actor leveraged a legitimate Windows DLL, secur32.dll, as the name of the configuration file for the ShadowPad backdoor.
Defence Evasion
Process Injection: Process Hollowing
T1055.012
Upon execution ShadowPad spawns a sacrificial process, which then utilises the technique of process hollowing to inject into the process.
Defence Evasion
Hide Artefacts: Hidden Files and Directories
T1564.001
Several malicious files were identified as having the NTFS attribute of hidden.
Defence Evasion
Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking
T1574.001
The backdoors leveraged DLL Search Order Hijacking.
Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
T1555:003
The NirSoft tool WebBrowserPassView.exe was also identified as being executed by the attacker.
Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager
T1555.004
Credential harvesting which indicated credentials from Windows Credential Manager were collected was identified on a domain controller.
Credential Access
OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
T1003.001
ProcDump.exe was leveraged on patient zero during the attack in order to dump credentials stored in the process memory of Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).
Credential Access
OS Credential Dumping: NTDS
T1003.003
The NTDS.dit was dumped and exfiltrated from a domain controller for each domain.
Credential Access
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files
T1552.001
Several instances of passwords in plaintext files were observed on hosts where ShadowPad was installed/
Credential Access
Input Capture: Keylogging
T1056:001
ShadowPad instances had a Keylogger module installed.
Discovery
File and Directory Discovery
T1083
Tree.exe was used to enumerate files and directories on compromised hosts.
Discovery
Network Share Discovery
T1135
A PowerShell script named ip445.ps1 was used throughout the attack to enumerate network shares across the Windows estate.
Discovery
System Network Configuration Discovery
T016
AdFind.exe can extract subnet information from Active Directory.
Discovery
Account Discovery: Domain Account
T1087.002
AdFind.exe can enumerate domain users.
Discovery
Domain Trust Discovery
T1482
AdFind.exe can gather information about organizational units (OUs) and domain trusts from Active Directory.
Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups
T1069
AdFind.exe can enumerate domain groups.
Discovery
Remote System Discovery
T1018
AdFind.exe has the ability to query Active Directory for computers.
Lateral Movement
Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.001
RDP was used by the threat actor to laterally move. It is unknown whether this was a deliberate act to move estates or if the threat actor was attempting to move to another domain.
Lateral Movement
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1021.002
The Powerview module of Powersploit was used to enumerate all SMB shares across the environment.
Lateral Movement
Remote Services: Windows Remote Management
T1021.006
WinRM was used by the actor during periods of network reconnaissance.
Lateral Movement
Remote Services: Distributed Component Object Model
T1021.003
Anti-virus alerts showed the threat actor as utilising WMI to laterally move to hosts across the network.
Collection
Automated Collection
T1119
Large scale credential harvesting was conducted against remote hosts from a domain controller.
Collection
Data Staged: Remote Data Staging
T1074.002
Credentials harvested by the threat actor were collected on a domain controller, prior to exfiltration.
Collection
Input Capture: Keylogging
T1056.001
ShadowPad instances had a Keylogger module installed which allowed them to capture the input of interactive sessions. The output was stored on disk in encrypted database files.
Collection
Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
T1560.001
The actor was routinely observed archiving collected data via 7zip.
Command and Control
Encrypted Channel
T1573
ShadowPad configurations indicated Command and Control communications were sent via port 443.
Command and Control
Proxy: Internal Proxy
T1090.001
ShadowPad instances had a Proxy module installed. It was identified that a proxy module was installed and was interacting via port 445.
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1041
ShadowPad has the capability to exfiltrate data.

[1] https://www.secureworks.com/research/shadowpad-malware-analysis

[2] https://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/cyber-security-services/research/chasing-shadows.html

[3] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29464