Bad VIB(E)s // Novel Malware in ESXi Hypervisors

As endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions improve malware detection efficacy on Windows systems, certain state-sponsored threat actors have shifted to developing and deploying malware on systems that do not generally support EDR such as network appliances, SAN arrays, and VMware ESXi servers.

Earlier this year, Mandiant identified a novel malware ecosystem impacting VMware ESXi, Linux vCenter servers, and Windows virtual machines that enables a threat actor to take the following actions:

This malware ecosystem was initially detected during an intrusion investigation when Mandiant identified attacker commands sourced from the legitimate VMware Tools process, vmtoolsd.exe, on a Windows virtual machine hosted on a VMware ESXi hypervisor. Mandiant analyzed the boot profile for the ESXi hypervisors and identified a never-before-seen technique in which a threat actor leveraged malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (“VIBs”) to install multiple backdoors on the ESXi hypervisors. We call these backdoors VIRTUALPITA and VIRTUALPIE (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Visualization of ESXi attack path

It is important to highlight that this is not an external remote code execution vulnerability; the attacker needs admin-level privileges to the ESXi hypervisor before they can deploy malware. Mandiant has no evidence of a zero-day vulnerability being used to gain initial access or deploy the malicious VIBs at the time of writing this post.

Details on how to manually detect if malicious or anomalous VIBs are currently installed in your ESXi environment are outlined in our hardening blog post.

Mandiant identified two (2) new malware families installed through malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs), which we have named VIRTUALPITA and VIRTUALPIE.

VMware VIBs are collections of files that are designed to facilitate software distribution and virtual system management. Since ESXi utilizes an in-memory filesystem, file edits are not saved across reboots. A VIB package can be used to create startup tasks, custom firewall rules, or deploy custom binaries upon the restart of an ESXi machine. These packages are generally utilized by administrators to deploy updates and maintain systems; however, this attacker was seen leveraging the packages as a persistence mechanism to maintain access across ESXi hypervisors.

VIBs can be broken down into three (3) components:

The XML Descriptor File is a config which contains references to the following:

The VIB payload is a .vgz archive which contains directories and files that will be created on the ESXi machine through the VIB. These files can then be called on to execute on boot when the VIBs are loaded.

The signature file is used to verify the host acceptance level of a VIB. The acceptance level is the digital signature system used by VMware to specify what testing has been done by VMware or partners before a VIB is published. Acceptance levels are set for hosts, image profiles, and individual VIBs. The four (4) acceptance levels along with their XML Descriptor short names are listed below:

Per VMware documentation, the default minimum acceptance level a VIB needs to be installed on a ESXi host is PartnerSupported. This acceptance level indicates the VIBs are published by a partner that VMware trusts. While this is the default acceptance level, it can be changed manually by an ESXi administrative account. The command used to install VIBs esxcli software vib install does not normally allow installations below the minimum acceptance level, but the --force flag can be used to ignore any systems acceptance level requirements when installing the VIB.

The malicious VIBs observed were labelled as PartnerSupported. Mandiant’s review of the Signature Files determined they were empty, and that an attacker modified the XML descriptor file to change the acceptance-level field from community to partner. A CommunitySupported acceptance-level indicates that the VIB was created by a third party which was not reviewed nor signed by VMware or its trusted partners. This indicated the attacker masqueraded these VIB files as PartnerSupported even though they only met the requirements of a CommunitySupported VIB. This also indicated that the VIB was created by an individual or company outside of VMware partner programs and has not gone through any VMware-approved testing program. Figure 2 contains an excerpt of the modified XML descriptor file that was identified.

Figure 2: Modified Descriptor XML

While the acceptance-level field was modified in the Descriptor XML by the attacker, the ESXi system still did not allow for a falsified VIB file to be installed below the minimal set acceptance level. To circumvent this, the attacker abused the --force flag to install malicious CommunitySupported VIBs.

Testing confirmed that modified fields from the XML descriptor file reflected the changes made in the output of commands used to list and verify VIBs. This included the modification of the <acceptance-level> field which tricks the command, esxcli software vib list, into displaying the incorrect acceptance level of the installed VIBs. The VMware command, esxcli software vib signature verify, verifies the signatures of installed VIB packages and displays the following fields:

Mandiant confirmed that this command detected when these acceptance levels were falsified, which identified the malicious VIBs. This command displays the acceptance level specified by the XML descriptor file, but the Signature Verification column clarifies if the signature file did not match the respective Descriptor XML. If the signature cannot be verified, the Signature Verification column will contain the value Signature Not Available: Host may have been upgraded from an older ESXi version. An example of this can be seen in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Example of falsified VIB acceptance level being seen in esxcli software vib signature verify

VIRTUALPITA is a 64-bit passive backdoor that creates a listener on a hardcoded port number on a VMware ESXi server. The backdoor often utilizes VMware service names and ports to masquerade as a legitimate service. It supports arbitrary command execution, file upload and download, and the ability to start and stop vmsyslogd. During arbitrary command execution, the malware also sets the environmental variable HISTFILE to 0 to further hide activity that occurred on the machine. Variants of this malware were found to listen on a Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) and log this activity to the file sysclog.

VIRTUALPIE is a lightweight backdoor written in Python that spawns a daemonized IPv6 listener on a hardcoded port on a VMware ESXi server. It supports arbitrary command line execution, file transfer capabilities, and reverse shell capabilities. Communications use a custom protocol and are encrypted using RC4.

The first malicious VIB named lsu-lsi-lsi-mrarpid-plugin referenced the payload lsu_lsi_.v05 (MD5: 2716c60c28cf7f7568f55ac33313468b) which contained the following three (3) files for which details can be found in Table 1:

Table 1: Lsu-lsi-lsi-mrarpid-plugin Malicious VIB contents

The second malicious VIB named ata-pata-pdc20211 referenced the payload payload1.v00 (MD5: 9ea86dccd5bbde47f8641b62a1eeff07) which contained the following two (2) files for which details can be found in Table 2:

Table 2: Lsu-lsi-lsi-mrarpid-plugin Malicious VIB contents

Mandiant discovered two (2) additional VIRTUALPITA samples listening on TCP port 7475 that were persistent as an init.d startup service on Linux vCenter systems. To disguise themselves, the binaries shared the name of the legitimate binary ksmd. KSMD (Kernel Same-Page Merging Daemon) is normally in charge of memory-saving de-duplication on Linux and would not be listening on this port. The samples were found under the following directories:

These backdoors were capable of arbitrary command execution, file transfer capabilities and the ability to start/stop vmsyslogd.

The Windows guest virtual machines which were hosted by the infected hypervisors also contained a unique malware sample located at C:\Windows\Temp\avp.exe. This malware, which we refer to as VIRTUALGATE, is a utility program written in C that is comprised of two (2) parts, a dropper, and the payload. The memory only dropper deobfuscates a second stage DLL payload that uses VMware's virtual machine communication interface (VMCI) sockets to run commands on a guest virtual machine from a hypervisor host, or between guest virtual machines on the same host.

Reviewing the ESXi hypervisors during an active attacker event, Mandiant identified an attacker executed commands to the guest machines through the process /bin/rdt (VIRTUALPITA). The parent process /bin/rdt spawned a bash shell which called on a python script specifying the target guest machine and commands to run as seen in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Commands executed by attacker on ESXi Hypervisor

Commands passed as arguments into e.py were also seen being executed by the targeted Windows guest machine, running as a child process under vmtoolsd.exe. This execution chain can be seen in Figure 5. The parent binary /bin/rdt was not present on disk but was able to be recovered by dumping the processes memory of the ESXi hypervisor. The python script that sent out commands to the guest machines, e.py, was unable to be recovered.

Figure 5: vmtoolsd.exe executing commands passed by ESXi

The commands the attacker ran through vmtoolsd.exe on the guest virtual machines were primarily focused on the enumeration and compression of files across both the system and connected file shares utilizing the native tools “dir” and “makecab”. Samples of these redacted commands can be seen in Figure 6.

Figure 6: File enumeration and compression commands utilized by attacker on Guest Virtual Machines

Mandiant also identified the attacker targeting a virtualized system for credential harvesting. The attacker used MiniDump to dump process memory and search for cleartext credentials. Figure 7 shows an excerpt of these commands.

Figure 7: Credential Dumping on Guest Machine

Once the process memory was dumped, a powershell script was used to parse the resultant file for any cleartext credentials. Figure 8 shows the contents of script used for credential harvesting. The attacker also targeted KeyPass password database files.

Figure 8: PowerShell Password Search Script

The attacker cleared the C:\Windows\Temp directory following most activity, but small errors were made which left behind trace artifacts. As shown in Figure 9, the attacker sent the output of a dir listing to a .tmp file. Since the attacker used the Linux syntax (2>null) to suppress errors instead of the Windows syntax (2>nul), all errors were forwarded to the file null in the working directory C:\Windows\System32\null. This file was only created if a file enumerated with the dir command had a directory path too long to be displayed.

Mandiant has begun tracking this activity as UNC3886. Given the highly targeted and evasive nature of this intrusion, we suspect UNC3886 motivation to be cyber espionage related. Additionally, we assess with low confidence that UNC3886 has a China-nexus. Each investigation conducted by Mandiant includes analysts from our Advanced Practices team who work to correlate activity observed in the thousands of investigations to which Mandiant responds. At times, we do not have the data available to directly attribute intrusion activity to a previously known group. In these cases, we create a new UNC group to track the activity that we observed. An UNC group is a cluster of related cyber intrusion activity, which includes observable artifacts such as adversary infrastructure, tools, and tradecraft, that we are not yet ready to give a classification such as APT or FIN. For more details on how Mandiant uses UNC groups, see our blog post: DebUNCing Attribution: How Mandiant Tracks Uncategorized Threat Actors.

While we noted the technique used by UNC3886 requires a deeper level of understanding of the ESXi operating system and VMWare’s virtualization platform, we anticipate a variety of other threat actors will use the information outlined in this research to begin building out similar capabilities. Mandiant recommends organizations using ESXi and the VMware infrastructure suite follow the hardening steps outlined in this blog post to minimize the attack surface of ESXi hosts.

rule M_APT_VIRTUALPITA_1

{

meta:

author = "Mandiant"

md5 = "fe34b7c071d96dac498b72a4a07cb246"

description = "Finds opcodes to set a port to bind on 2233, encompassing the setsockopt(), htons(), and bind() from 40973d to 409791 in fe34b7c071d96dac498b72a4a07cb246"

strings:

$x = {8b ?? ?? 4? b8 04 00 00 00 [0 - 4] ba 02 00 00 00 be 01 00 00 00 [0 - 2] e8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 89 4? ?? 83 7? ?? 00 79 [0 - 50] ba 10 00 00 00 [0 - 10] e8}

condition:

uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and all of them

}

rule M_APT_VIRTUALPITA_2

{

meta:

author = "Mandiant"

md5 = "fe34b7c071d96dac498b72a4a07cb246"

description = "Finds opcodes to decode and parse the recieved data in the socket buffer in fe34b7c071d96dac498b72a4a07cb246.  Opcodes from 401a36 to 401adc"

strings:

$x = {85 c0 74 ?? c7 05 ?? ?? ?? ?? fb ff ff ff c7 8? ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 00 00 00 e9 ?? ?? ?? ?? 4? 8b 05 ?? ?? ?? ?? 4? 83 c0 01 4? 89 05 ?? ?? ?? ?? c7 4? ?? 00 00 00 00 e9 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8b 4? ?? 4? 98 4? 8d 9? ?? ?? ?? ?? 4? 8d ?? e0 4? 8b 0? 4? 89 0? 4? 8b 4? ?? 4? 89 4? ?? 8b 4? ?? 4? 98 4? 8d b? ?? ?? ?? ?? b? ?? ?? ?? ?? e8 ?? ?? ?? ?? c7 4? ?? 00 00 00 00 eb ?? 8b 4? ?? 8b 4? ?? 01 c1 8b 4? ?? 03 4? ?? 4? 98 0f b6 9? ?? ?? ?? ?? 8b 4? ?? 4? 98 0f b6 8? ?? ?? ?? ?? 31 c2 4? 63 c1 88 9? ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 4? ?? 01}

condition:

uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and all of them

}

rule M_APT_VIRTUALPITA_3

{

meta:

author = "Mandiant"

md5 = "fe34b7c071d96dac498b72a4a07cb246"

description = "Finds opcodes from 409dd8 to 409e46 in fe34b7c071d96dac498b72a4a07cb246 to set the HISTFILE environment variable to 'F' with a putenv() after loading each character individually."

strings:

$x = {4? 8b 4? ?? c6 00 48 4? 8b 4? ?? 4? 83 c0 05 c6 00 49 4? 8b 4? ?? 4? 83 c0 01 c6 00 49 4? 8b 4? ?? 4? 83 c0 06 c6 00 4c 4? 8b 4? ?? 4? 83 c0 02 c6 00 53 4? 8b 4? ?? 4? 83 c0 07 c6 00 45 4? 8b 4? ?? 4? 83 c0 03 c6 00 54 4? 8b 4? ?? 4? 83 c0 08 c6 00 3d 4? 8b 4? ?? 4? 83 c0 04 c6 00 46 4? 8b 4? ?? 4? 83 c0 09 c6 00 00 4? 8b 7? ?? e8}

condition:

uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and all of them

}

rule M_APT_VIRTUALPITA_4

{

meta:

author = "Mandiant"

md5 = "fe34b7c071d96dac498b72a4a07cb246"

description = "Finds opcodes from 401f1c to 401f4f in fe34b7c071d96dac498b72a4a07cb246 to decode text with multiple XORs"

strings:

$x = {4? 8b 4? ?? 4? 83 c1 30 4? 8b 4? ?? 4? 8b 10 8b 4? ?? 4? 98 4? 8b 04 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 4? 31 c2 4? 8b 4? ?? 4? 83 c0 28 4? 8b 00 4? c1 e8 10 0f b6 c0 4? 98 4? 8b 04}

condition:

uint32(0) == 0x464c457f and all of them

}

rule M_Hunting_Script_LaunchAndDelete_1

{

meta:

author = "Mandiant"

md5 = "bd6e38b6ff85ab02c1a4325e8af29ce4"

description = "Finds scripts that launch and then delete files, indicative of cleaning up tracks and remaining in-memory only."

strings:

$ss = /setsid[^\n\r]{,250}-i[\r\n]{,5}rm/

condition:

all of them

}

rule M_Hunting_Python_Backdoor_CommandParser_1

{

meta:

author = "Mandiant"

md5 = "61ab3f6401d60ec36cd3ac980a8deb75"

description = "Finds strings indicative of the vmsyslog.py python backdoor."

strings:

$key1 = "readInt8()" ascii wide

$key2 = "upload" ascii wide

$key3 = "download" ascii wide

$key4 = "shell" ascii wide

$key5 = "execute" ascii wide

$re1 = /def\srun.{,20}command\s?=\s?self\.conn\.readInt8\(\).{,75}upload.{,75}download.{,75}shell.{,75}execute/s

condition:

filesize < 200KB and all of them

}

Special thanks to Brad Slaybaugh, Joshua Kim, Zachary Smith, Kirstie Failey, Nick Simonian, and Charles Carmakal for their assistance with the investigation, technical review, and creating detections for the malware families discussed in this blog post. In addition, we would also like to thank VMware for their collaboration on this research.